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VESTED RIGHTS AND ZONING: AVOIDING
ALL-OR-NOTHING RESULTS
Abstract: In real estate development, courts and legislatures use the
vested rights doctrine to determine whether local government should
be allowed to enforce newly enacted zoning ordinances against
landowners. As real estate development projects continue to increase in
scope and expense, and as zoning regulations become more complex
and sensitive to environmental awareness, the vested rights debate will
remain a contentious issue in land use law. The three dominant vested
rights rules in use today generally assume that vested rights protection
requires an all-or-nothing result, forcing the debate to revolve almost
solely around tuning: should vested rights protection be granted now or
later? This outcome affords no compromise; either developers get all
the protection from new regulations they want and local governments
get no flexibility to adapt projects to evolving public interests, or local
governments get all the flexibility they want, and developers risk losing
their projects altogether. This Note critiques the three major
approaches and suggests that one way to add more flexibility to the
current vesting scheme is to expand or contract the scope of protection
granted based on the breadth of developers' disclosure.
INTRODUCTION
In real estate development, courts and legislatures use the vested
rights doctrine to determine whether landowners have proceeded
sufficiently far down the path of development of their land that the
local government should not be allowed to enforce newly enacted
zoning ordinances against them.' Landowners claiming vested rights
1 See Richard S. Cunningham & David H. Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land
Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625, 641 (1978) ; John .). Delaney, Vesting Verities and the
Development Chronology: A Gaping Disconnect?, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 603, 603 (2000);
Gregory Overstreet & Diana M. Kirchheim, The Quest for the Best Test to Vest: Washington's
Vested Rights Doctrine Beats the Rest, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2000). The doctrine
does not, however, generally give a developer permanent protection for his land. See Over-
street & Kirchheim, supra, at 1060. Common law and statutory versions of the doctrine
grant vesting pursuant to some fixed point in the development process (e.g., building
permit, subdivision application) which generally has a statutory expiration date. See id.
Statutory vested rights doctrines may impose their own expiration dates as well. See Over-
street & Kirchheim, supra, at 1060; see, e.g., Mass. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000). The
vested rights doctrine is distinguished from the pre-existing non-conforming use/structure
doctrine because it addresses incomplete, as opposed to pre-existing, developments. See
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protection essentially argue that because they have invested so much
money in the development of their land, relying on the local govern-
ment's approval of their development plans, it is unfair to allow the
local government to change the rules with respect to their project. 2
Because the doctrine pits an individual's right to use and enjoy prop-
erty against the government's power to regulate, it creates a hotly con-
tested battleground between owners of private property and local
government.3
From the landowner/developer's perspective, the right to use
and develop land is generally one of the most important and valuable
rights associated with the land. 4 This right is, however, subject to the
government's exercise of its police power. 5 While still in the process of
development, therefore, landowners seek vested rights status because
it prevents the local government from exercising police power by en-
forcing new zoning laws against their development.6 Because new zon-
ing laws are almost always stricter, enforcement would generally re-
quire scaling back a project. Acquiring vested rights protection,
therefore, preserves developers' investment in the project as origi-
nally conceived and designed.? Where the acquisition of vested rights
status remains uncertain, however, future profits also remain uncer-
tain, thereby discouraging landowners from investing in develop-
ment.8
Cunningham & Kremer, supra, at 670. This Note will focus on vesting in zoning ordi-
nances, however, the ability to develop land can also be affected by other land use controls
such as environmental laws.
2 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 603; David G. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel.. Application of the
Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 Utus. L. ANN. 63, 66
(1971); Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1043.
3 See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1044.
4 John J. Delaney & Emily J. Vaias, Recognizing Vested Development Rights as Protected Prop-
erty in Fifth Amendment Due Process and Takings Claims, 49 WASII. U. J. URB. & CorrrEmp. L.
27, 30 (1996).
3 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 632-33.
6
 See id. at 633.
7 See E. A. Prichard & Gregory A. Riegle, Searching for Certainty: Virginia's Evolutionary
Approach to Vested Rights, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 983, 1007-08 (1999); Ralph D. Rinaldi,
Virginia's Vested Property Rights Rule: Legal and Economic Considerations, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV,
77, 97-98 (1994). Although the discussion in both articles focuses on Virginia's vested
rights rule, most of the observations made about the development process and impact of
the vested rights doctrine are generally applicable. See Prichard & Riegle, supra, at 1007-
08; Rinaldi, supra, at 97-98.
8 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1044; Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at
999, 1008; Roger D. Wynne, Washington's Vested Rights Doctrine: How We Have Muddled a Sim-
ple Concept and How We Can Reclaim It, 24 SE.Arrti U. L. REV. 851, 855 (2001).
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The complex, lengthy, and expensive nature of modern land de-
velopment compounds developers' investment risk prior to the at-
tainment of vested rights. 9 The nature of modern real estate devel-
opment increasingly requires significant investment in the early
planning stages.° In addition, rapid population growth has increased
the demand for large-scale land development." At the same time, new
environmental impact awareness has forced local governments to cre-
ate additional review agencies, add additional layers to the permitting
process, and adopt more regulations.° Larger projects developed un-
der this complex regulatory environment need greater financial re-
sources to pay for the preparation of permit applications and engi-
neering and preliminary site work, and to finance these resources
over a long period of time until development is complete and profit
realized." In addition, more levels of review create more opportuni-
ties for delay, which only increases financing costs." Where the devel-
oper is faced with litigating his vested rights because the law is unclear
or uncertain, he must add attorney's fees to his mounting costs. 15
Local governments have their own development interests. 16 They
want to preserve enough flexibility in the development process to be
able to adapt their land use regulations over time to address new
situations and to implement new approaches to community plan-
ning." The earliest stages of project review generally do not require
developers to submit particularly detailed plans for their proposed
developments." In the case of large-scale developments that take
°Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 999; Walter F. Witt, Jr., Vested Rights in Land Uses—
A View From the Practitioner's Perspective, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 317, 318 (1986).
1 ° See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1048-54; Prichard & Riegle, supra note
7, at 999.
11 Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 999.
" 2 Delaney, supra note 1, at 617; Prichard & Riegle, SUM note 7, at 998; Witt, supra
note 9, at 318. For example, in California, concern about managing growth in coastal areas
led to the passage of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act, which created a new
agency, the California Coastal Zone Commission. Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast
Reg'l Conun'n, 553 P.2d 546, 548, 557 (Cal. 1976). Developers seeking to build in a coastal
zone had to apply to this new agency for a permit, in addition to any other permits already
required by law. Id.
13 Overstreet & Rirchheim, supra note 1, at 1056; Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at
999; Witt, supra note 9, at 318.
14 See Overstreet & Kirchheina, supra note 1, at 1056.
13 Id. at 1056; Rinaldi, supra note 7, at 99.
16 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 603; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855.
'7 Delaney, supra note 1, at 603; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855.
'a See, e.g., Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P'ship, 623 A.2d 1296, 1298 (Md. 1992) (site plan applica-
tion did not require detailed construction drawings); Westside Bus. Park v. Pierce County,
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years to complete, the local government wants the freedom to revise
its regulations as the needs of the community change, and before the
developer gains the right to fix the details of the development under
outdated ordinances. 19 Local governments do not welcome protracted
litigation either because it consumes their time and resources, which
are already limited by scarce tax dollars."
In an attempt to balance developers' need for certainty with local
governments' need for flexibility, each state has adopted at common
law or established by statute its own standard for granting vested
rights.21 Although there are variations and overlaps, the rules fall gen-
erally into one of three categories: the majority rule, the minority rule
and the early-vesting rule. 22 All three rules generally grant complete
protection from changes in the zoning law at the time of vesting."
The primary difference, therefore, between the rules is the point in
time at which development rights can become vested: late, midway, or
early in the development process."
Because vesting is generally an all-or-nothing prospect, scholarly
commentary focuses largely on the only remaining open issue: the
time at which vesting is granted. 25 The problem, however, is that no
matter what point in time is selected, an all-or-nothing outcome nec-
essarily awards complete victory to only one party. 26 This result leaves
little room for compromise, either devastating developers to save the
public interest, or sacrificing the public interest to preserve develop-
ers' investments."
A few scholarly commentators have alluded to the idea of recon-
sidering the scope of vesting, or in other words, the degree of protec-
tion from changes in the zoning law that is granted at the time of vest-
5 P.3d 713,715 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (short plat application only showed lot lines); Erick-
son & Assoc., Inc. v. McLerran, 872 P.2d 1090,1092,1096 (Wash. 1994) (master use permit
applications are filed in earliest stages of project and generally change over time as devel-
oper's plans become more concrete).
19 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 647; Delaney, supra note 1, at 603;
Wynne, supra note 8, at 855.
20 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1057; Rinaldi, supra note 7, at 99.
21 See Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 32-33, 39 app. I at 40-44, app. 11.
" See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045.
" See infra notes 240-244,248-258,259-270 and accompanying text.
24 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 607, 619; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045-
46.
" See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 39 app. I at 40-44;
Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045,1065.
" See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855-57.
27 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710-11.
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ing.28 This Note builds on this idea by suggesting that courts and legis-
latures expand or contract the scope of protection granted along a
spectrum, based on the amount of information developers have dis-
closed about their projects." The advantage of this analysis is that by
rejecting the all-or-nothing outcome, it would create the possibility of
a compromise outcome between developers and local governments."
Section I provides an explanation of the majority, minority, and
early-vesting rules, respectively, examining the law of one or two states
which provide examples of each version of the doctrine. 31 Section II
summarizes the relevant commentary and criticism of all three rules,
demonstrating the serious deficiencies in the current doctrine." Sec-
tion III begins by demonstrating how all three rules result in the same
all-or-nothing outcome in terms of the scope of protection granted."
It then considers how a closer examination of the relationship be-
tween disclosure in the development process and the scope of rights
granted might alter the focus of the vested rights debate." It further
demonstrates how courts under all three doctrines already implicitly
recognize this relationship. 35 Finally, Section III argues that a spec-
trum vesting analysis would add some flexibility to the doctrine,
thereby encouraging compromise and mitigating some of the most
severe results of the current doctrine."
I. THE MAJORITY, MINORITY AND EARLY-VESTING RULES
Before grappling with the problems created by the current vested
rights doctrine, or proposing ways to improve it, it is important to un-
derstand the three rules under which vested rights now operate. Be-
cause vested rights in land development are controlled by state law,
each state has established its own rule, either by common law or by
statute. 37 The rules established generally fall into three groups, from
28 See id. at 722-23; Grayson P. Hanes & J. Randall Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use
and Development,• 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373,402-03 (1989); Claire B. Levy, Changes to
Colorado's Vested Property Rights Law, 28 COLO. LAW. 83, 85 (1999); Wynne, supra note 8, at
911-12; see infra notes 296-299 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 295-338 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 295-338 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 37-186 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 187-224 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 225-294 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 225-294 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 225-294 and accompanying text.
311 See infra notes 295-338 and accompanying text.
37 Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 32-34,39 app. I at 90-44, app. II.
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which general rules can be drawn: first, a majority rule that grants
vesting late in the development process; second, a minority rule that
grants vesting somewhat earlier in the process; and third, an early-
vesting rule that, as its name suggests, grants vesting very early in the
development process.3
A. The Majority Rule
Professor David Heeter first articulated the black letter majority
vested rights rule in 1971 after analyzing the results of his state-by-
state survey of the relevant case law. 39
 This rule provides that land-
owners will be protected when, relying in good faith upon an act or
omission of the local government, they have made substantial expen-
ditures or commitments prior to a change in the zoning law.0
 This
rule, also referred to as the "building permit plus construction" rule,
is followed in more than 30 states. 41 Although the rule itself speaks
vaguely of an act or omission of the local government, most states that
follow this rule require the act to be the issuance of a building per-
mit. 42
California and Maryland provide two helpful illustrations of the
majority rule at common law.43
 Although California's common law
majority rule has been superseded by a statute" embracing an earlier
vesting doctrine, 45 one of the most famous majority rule vested rights
cases came out of California.46 In 1976, in Avco Community Developers,
Inc. v. South Coastal Regional Commission, the California Supreme Court
" Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045-46.
39 fleeter, supra note 2, at 66.
40 Id.
41 Delaney, supra note 1, at 607, 615; Overstreet & Kirchheini, supra note 1, at 1061.
42 Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 32, 39 app. I at 40-44; Overstreet & Kirchheim, su-
pra note 1, at 1045.
See generally Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg'l Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546
(Cal. 1976) (describing California's formulation of the common law majority rule); Prince
George's County v. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. P'ship, 623 A.2d 1296 (Md. 1992) (describing Mary-
land's formulation of the common law majority rule).
44 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 65865.2, 66498.1—.3 (West 1997) (authorizing development
agreements and establishing vesting tentative map approvals); See Santa Margarita Area
Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 746 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (legislature intended to prevent Autotype outcomes by allowing local govern-
ment to freeze vesting before issuing a building permit).
45 Thomas G. Pelham et al., "What Do You Mean I Can't Build!? "A Comparative Analysis of
taken Property Rights Vest, 31 URB. LAW. 901, 903 (1999). The provisions of the California
statute now allow very early vesting through development agreements and vesting tentative
maps. Id.
46 Avco Only. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 546; see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
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refused to grant vested rights protection to a developer who had not
yet obtained any building permits. 41 This decision, although not the
first majority rule case, became widely recognized as embodying the
"quintessential" illustration of the majority rule, and the economic
hardship it can impose on developers."
The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act came into effect
after Avco Community Developers ("Avco") had acquired more than
5,000 acres to be developed as a planned residential community. 49
The law provided that certain "coastal zone" developments had to ob-
tain a permit from the California Coastal Zone Commission, unless
the developer had already secured a vested right to proceed." Al-
though Avco had by then spent more than two million dollars on
planning and infrastructure development, it lost its vested rights claim
because it had not yet obtained a building permit nor had it per-
formed substantial construction as required at common law. 51
The Avco court also noted that it had no way to define the devel-
opment for which Avco sought protected status. 52 Although the
county was aware that Avco intended to develop the land as a residen-
tial community, Avco had not yet submitted detailed plans regarding
the number, size, height, or placement of the proposed buildings."
The court said that without this information, it would be impossible
to define what Avco had the right to build. 54 Therefore, even if the
common law supported vesting on the basis of rezoning or some
other government act, the court would still hold that Avco had gained
no vested rights."
Finally, the court explained that if the law allowed vested rights
based on rezoning or on preliminary approvals, the result would be to
Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 553-54.
48 E.g., Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 704; see, e.g., Delaney, supra note I, at
613-14; David Hartman, Risky Business: Vested Real Property Development Rights—The Texas
Experience and Proposals for the Texas Legislature to Improve Certainty in the Law, 30 TEX. :amt.
L. Ray. 297,300 (1999); Pelham et al., supra note 45, at 902.
49 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 548-49. The Act placed restrictions on devel-
opment of the coastal zone for one year in order to slow development while the Commis-
sion prepared a new comprehensive plan for the area. Id. at 557.
50 Id. at 548.
51 Id. at 549,553. Avco proposed two other theories for relief, all of which the court re-
jected. Id. at 555-56.
" See id. at 552.
" Id. However, the trial court agreed with Avco that it had submitted a tract map and a
picture of a model of the development, and that together with the applicable regulations,
the county could have figured out what Avco intended to build. Id.
Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 552.
55 See id. at 552-54.
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freeze the applicable zoning laws as of the time of rezoning or ap-
proval of preliminary plans. 56 Developers would be able to leave sub-
divided but undeveloped lots vacant for years, all the while preserving
their right to develop them in the future, under long out-of-date zon-
ing laws.57 According to the Avco court, this scenario would unrea-
sonably constrain the government's ability to control land use policy.°
California no longer follows Avco, but many other states employ a
similar rule.59 In 1979, in Prince George's County v. Equitable Trust Co.,
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that vested rights protec-
tion could only be granted when a developer had obtained a building
permit and begun substantial construction.° Equitable Trust had
subdivided commercially zoned land into two parcels, but had only
prepared plans and obtained a building permit for construction on
one parcel.61
 Soon after Equitable Trust began construction, both
parcels were rezoned for residential use only, pursuant to a regional
rezoning plan. 62
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the rezoning
was valid as applied to the parcel where no development had begun,
but was invalid as applied to the parcel where Equitable Trust had
been issued a building permit and had begun substantial construc-
tion.63
 The court said that when a landowner acquires a building
permit, begins construction in good faith, and completes substantial
construction of the project, his right to finish the project and begin
using it cannot be altered by a subsequent change in the zoning ordi-
nance.64
While the acquisition of a building permit is a fairly clear re-
quirement, the Equitable Trust Co. rule fails to define "substantial con-
struction. "65
 In 1993, in Prince George's County v. Sunrise Development Ltd.
Partnership, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that substantial con-
struction required the completion of enough work that a reasonable
member of the public could recognize that a structure was being built
56 Id. at 554. This is precisely what the minority rule purports to do. See infra notes 84-
134 and accompanying text.
57 Avco Cntly. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2(1 at 554.
58 Id.
" See Delaney, supra note 1, at 607; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1061.
60 408 A.2d 737,742-43 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
61 Id. at 739-40.
62 Id. at 738-39.
63 Id. at 742-43.
84 Id. at 741.
65 Equitable Truss Co., 408 A.2d at 741.
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for a use permitted by the zoning law. 66 Sunrise Development Limited
Partnership ("SDLP") acquired a lot zoned for multi-family high den-
sity residential use and submitted a site plan which portrayed the
building footprint and the location of streets and parking areas, but
did not contain any detailed structural or construction drawings. 67
After SDLP obtained a building permit for preliminary construction
and poured the first footing, the county enacted legislation downzon-
ing the property to multi-family medium density residential-condo
use.68 By this point, SDLP claimed to have spent more than two mil-
lion dollars on site development costs including legal fees, accounting
fees, insurance, architectural and engineering services, loan interest,
taxes, various consulting fees, and permit fees. 69
Because SDLP had been issued a building permit, the case
turned on the court's interpretation of the substantial construction
requirement of Maryland's vested rights doctrine." The court ex-
plained that one of the rationales behind the substantial construction
requirement was public perception of law enforcement. 71 If construc-
tion was sufficiently far along such that the public would perceive that
a building was begun, they would not expect the new law to be en-
forced against it. 72 Conversely, if construction was so minimal when
the law changed that the public could not perceive it, then they would
expect the new law to be enforced against any building that later
arose." Therefore, the court held that substantial construction meant
completing enough work that a reasonable passerby would recognize
that a building was being erected for a permitted use. 74 On the instant
facts, the court concluded that the footing was so unnoticeable that it
could only be found with the use of a site plan, and therefore denied
SDLP vested rights to proceed with construction of its building as
planned."
All states following the majority rule require the developer to
demonstrate some form of substantial reliance in addition to obtain-
ing a building permit, but they differ as to what constitutes substantial
66 623 A.2d 1296, 1304 (Md. 1993).
67 Id. at 1297-98.
65 Id. at 1298-99.
65 Id. at 12981E1.
7° See id. at 1301.
71 Sumise Deu Ltd. rship, 623 A.2d. at 1304.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
76 Id. at 1304-05.
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reliance." The black letter majority rule discussed previously refers to
"substantial expenditures."77 Maryland's version of the majority rule
as articulated by Equitable Trust Co. and further defined by Sunrise De-
velopment Ltd. Partnership requires "substantial construction."78 The
various methods used to determine what constitutes substantial reli-
ance among the majority rule states generally fall into one of three
categories: 1) a proportionate/ratio test, 2) a balancing test, or 3) a
physical changes to land test."
The proportionate/ratio test determines what percentage of the
project's final cost is represented by the amount of money already
spent. 80
 The balancing test tries to weigh the developer's right to use
his land and the amount of money already spent on his development,
versus the public interests at stake in enforcing the new zoning ordi-
nance.'" Finally, the physical changes test looks for actual and contin-
ued construction of the permitted structure. 82 This final test is the
approach the Maryland Court of Appeals took in Sunrise Development
Ltd. Partnership when it required sufficient actual construction such
that a passerby would realize that a building was begun. 83
B. The Minority Rule
In contrast to the majority rule's requirement of building permit
approval, the minority rule defines government approval as any site-
specific approval, such as a preliminary plan. 84 In addition, some ver-
sions of the minority rule also dispense with the majority rule's sub-
7a John. J. Delaney, Vested Rights and the Development Chronology 2000 Update, SF08
A.B.A. 379, 384 (2000).
77 John J. Delaney Sc William Kontiners, He Who Rests Less, Vests Best: Acquisition of Vested
Rights in Land Development, 23 ST. Louts U. L.J. 219, 222 (1979); see fleeter, supra note 2, at
66.
78 Sunrise Deu Ltd. P'ship, 623 A.2d at 1301; Equitable Trust Co., 408 A.2d at 741.
"Delaney, supra note 76, at 384-85; Delaney, supra note 1, at 608.
80 Delaney, supra note 76, at 384. New York, for example, follows this rule. Reichen-
bach v. Windward at Southampton, 364 N.Y.S.2d 283, 288-89 (1975) (approximately
$6,000 spent on construction not substantial when compared to $600,000 total cost of
proposed project).
81
 Delaney, supra note 76, at 385.
" Id.
" See 623 A.2d at 1304.
84 Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045, 1065;
see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-49-55D-52 (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100);
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I, c.4.).
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stantial reliance requirernent 85 States following the minority rule
generally establish vested rights protections by statute, but may have
common law protections as well." New Jersey and Virginia provide
good illustrations of the minority rule in practice: New Jersey follows a
typical minority rule statute, while Virginia developed its rule by
common law and later codified it. 87
New jersey has provided vested rights protection under a minor-
ity rule statute since 1976. 88 According to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, "[Ore purpose of the statute is to give a developer a reason-
able period of protection from changes in the zoning law."89 By pro-
viding such protection, the legislature tried to find a reasonable bal-
ance between landowners' desire for certainty in the zoning law and
local governments' need for flexibility to plan for the future needs of
the community."
Following the minority rule, the statute focuses clearly on appli-
cation approval.° The statute protects developers who have received
preliminary approval of a major subdivision or site plan from zoning
changes for a period of three years 92 In addition, the statute requires
local governments to evaluate applications for final approval accord-
ing to the laws in effect at the time of preliminary approval." Once a
project has been granted final approval, the preliminary period of
protection ends, and the statute protects the project from zoning
85 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045,
1065; see, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-49-55D-52 (West, WESTLAW through L.2001,
c.100); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I, c.4.).
86 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045.
Bt NJ. STAT. ANN. §g 40:55D-49-55D-52 (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100); VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I, c.4.); Prichard &
Riegle, supra note 7, at 993, 999-1000.
88 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-49-55D-52 (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100);
Carl S. Bisgaier & Yvonne Marcuse, Vesting and the Time of Decision Rule, N.J. Law., Nov.—
Dec. 1997, at 13, 14-15. When a developer, for whatever reason, does not. gain vesting
under the statute, New Jersey provides common law vesting according to the majority rule.
See Palatine I v. Planning Bd., 628 A,2d 321, 325-28 (N.J. 1993). The statute, therefore, by
granting vested rights on approval of a subdivision or site plan, allows developers to gain
protection earlier than under the common law rule. See §§ 40:55D-49-40:55D-52; Palatine I,
628 A.2d at 325-28.
Palatine I, 628 A.2d at 325.
80 Id. at 329-30 (citing Gruber v. Mayor of Raritan Township, 186 A.2d 489, 497
(1962)).
91 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-49-55D-52 (West, WESTLAW through L.200), c.100).
92 Id. § 40:55D-49. In the case of a subdivision or site plan for more than 50 acres, the
planning board has the discretion to grant a longer period of protection. Id. § 40:55D-
49(d).
23 Id. § 40:55D-49(a).
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changes for an additional two years." The statute also authorizes local
governments to enact ordinances specifying the requirements for
subdivision and site plan approval, and includes an extensive list of its
own requirements." The number of requirements set by the statute
ensures that any such plan will necessarily be very detailed."
Recent case law illustrates the application of New Jersey's minor-
ity rule.97 In 1991, in Lake Shore Estates, Inc. v. Denville Township Plan-
ning Board, the New Jersey Superior Court refused to grant a devel-
oper protection from a change in the zoning law on the grounds that
the township had never approved a subdivision application." Several
years previously, Lake Shore Estates ("Lake Shore") had submitted a
subdivision application for a residential development." The following
month, the township adopted an ordinance reducing the allowable
density for this type of development.'" The township subsequently
denied the application.'" A few years later, a trial court struck down
the ordinance as unconstitutional, and invited Lake Shore to resub-
mit its application.'" The day before the revised application was sub-
mitted, however, the township passed a modified version of its previ-
ous ordinance.'"
The court explained that, in the absence of an approved applica-
tion, the statutory standard required that it defer to the township's
legislative decision in pursuit of the public interest.'" The court,
therefore, rejected Lake Shore's argument that its resubmitted appli-
cation should be considered without regard to the modified ordi-
nance.'" The court held that under the statute it had to enforce zon-
ing laws in effect at the time the revised application was submitted.'"
94 Id. § 40:55D-52(a). Again, for larger developments, the planning board has the dis-
cretion to grant a longer period of protection. Id. § 40:55D-52(b).
95 Id. § 40:55D-38. The statute requires that all plans include provisions for adequate
facilities, such as streets, water supply, sewerage, utilities, and open space, and conform to
environmental and other public safety standards. § 40:55D-'38.
96 SeeN J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-38 (West, WESTLAW through L.2001, c.100).
97 See Lake Shore Estates, Inc. v. Denville Township Planning Bd., 605 A.2d 1106,1111—
12 (Nli. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
" Id. at 1111. Where the facts are not important to the ultimate outcome of the case,
they have been simplified for the sake of brevity.
" Id. at 1108.
Id.
101
 Lake Shore Estates, Inc., 605 A.2d at 1108.
102 m
103 m
11" Id. at 1111.
105 Id. at 1111-12.
196 Lake Shore Estates, Inc., 605 A.2d at 1111-12.
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In contrast to New Jersey's relatively long-standing statutory mi-
nority rule, Virginia began developing its version of the minority rule
by common law, only very recently codifying and expanding it by stat-
ute. 1°1 At first, Virginia common law adopted the late vesting majority
rule. 108 Then, about thirty years ago, the courts began to turn away
from the majority rule in favor of an earlier vesting rule. 109 In 1972, in
Board of Supervisors v. Cities Service Oil Co. and Board of Supervisors v.
Medical Structures, Inc., the Virginia Supreme Court issued two com-
panion cases holding that counties could not enforce new land use
restrictions against developers who had received special use permits,
filed site plans, and incurred substantial expenditures before the new
restrictions became effective."
In Medical Structures, the county granted a special use permit to
develop a nursing home in a residential district." A few years later,
when the developer applied for site plan approval, the county denied
his application on the grounds that a new zoning ordinance no
longer permitted nursing homes in residential districts. 112 The devel-
oper appealed, claiming he had gained a vested right in his proposed
use upon the issuance of the special use permit and his reliance on
it. 113
The court first observed that site plans had effectively displaced
building permits as the crucial documents in the development proc-
ess." It pointed out that site plan applications require detailed in-
formation about the proposed project, including maps, surveys, and
studies.115 The court found that when a site plan was approved, a later
request for building permit approval was granted almost as a matter
of course." Without any further explanation, the court went on to
hold that where a developer has received a special use permit, filed
and pursued approval of a site plan, and incurred substantial expen-
10 Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 993, 999-1000.
108 McClung v. Henrico County, 108 S.E.2d 513, 516 (Va. 1959); Prichard & Riegle, su-
pra note 7, at 990-91.
I 09 See Bd. of Supervisors v. Cities Service Oil Co., 193 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Va. 1972); Bd. of
Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Va. 1972).
II° Cities Service Oil, Co., 193 S.E.2d at 3; Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d at 801.
"I Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d at 800. The permit was actually issued to a prede-
cessor in title, but the subsequent transfer of title is irrelevant to the disposition of the
case. Id.
112 Id. at 800-01.
113 Id. at 801.
114 Id.
115 Id.
118 Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d at 801.
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ditures in good faith before the zoning changed, that developer gains
a vested right to pursue the permitted land use. 117
In the companion case, Cities Service Oil Co., the same county had
denied site plan approval for a developer with a special use permit for
a gas station, on the grounds that gas stations were no longer permit-
ted in the district. 118 There, the court reached the same conclusion as
above, and quoted from Medical Structures in its decision. 119 Although
neither decision articulates an explicit adoption of the minority rule,
the outcome implies that the court rejected the majority rule building
permit requirement in favor of the minority rule's earlier vesting
scheme.'"
Almost twenty years later, when presented with the opportunity to
adopt an even more liberal vesting rule, the Virginia Supreme Court
instead chose to draw the line clearly at permit approval.'" In 1990, in
Notestein v. Board of Supervisors, the Virginia Supreme Court refused to
grant vested rights in the absence of a government approval. 122
 The
Notesteins had secured financing and began conducting engineering
studies for a private landfill, based on verbal indications from the
county that their project would be approved.'" Meanwhile, the
county adopted a new ordinance prohibiting landfills in that dis-
trict. 124 Citing Medical Structures and Cities Service Oil. the court denied
the Notesteins' claim for relief, distinguishing their case on the
grounds that no significant governmental act had occurred. 125 The
court disregarded the Notesteins' financial investment because their
application had not yet been approved—in other words, they had not
obtained a government approval upon which to rely. 126
The Virginia Supreme court has continued to apply its approval-
based minority rule, even to large-scale multi-stage development proj-
ects. 127 In 1994, in Board of Supervisors v. Trollingwood Partnership, the
court refused to protect the final stage of a development project from
" 7 Id.
118 Cities Service Oil Co., 193 S.E.2d at 3.
"9 Id.
' 2° See Cities Service Oil, Co., 193 S.E.2d at 3; Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d at 801.
121 See Notestein v. ]3d. of Supervisors, 393 S.E.2d 205,207-08 (W. 1990); Rinaldi, supra
note 7, at 81.
122
 Notestein, 393 S.E.2d at 207-08.
123 Id. at 206.
1124 Id. at 207.
' 25 Id. at 207-08.
126 See id. at 208.
127 See Bd. of Supervisors v. Trollingwood P'ship, 445 S.E.2d 151,152-53 (Va. 1994).
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a change in the zoning law, where plans for that stage had not yet
been approved)" When the new zoning ordinance became effective,
the developer had only submitted plans and received approval for the
first two stages of his project. 126
Finally, in 1998, Virginia amended its zoning ordinance enabling
statute to codify and expand upon its common law minority rule. 1"
The act now provides vested rights status when a landowner "(i) ob-
tains . . . a significant affirmative governmental act. . , (ii) relies in
good faith on [the act], and (iii) incurs extensive obligations or sub-
stantial expenses . . . in reliance on [the act].” 1 " Distinguishing itself
from what otherwise sounds like a mere recitation of the majority
rule, the statute goes on to list things that it deems, without limita-
tion, to be "significant affirmative governmental act[s]." 1" The list
includes approval of any of the following applications: 1) rezoning for
a specific use or density; 2) special exception or use permit; 3) vari-
ance; 4) preliminary subdivision plat, site plan or development plan;
and 5) final subdivision plat, site plan or development plan)" By
granting vested rights protection on approval of applications submit-
ted in advance of the building permit stage, the statute clearly falls
into the minority rule camp. 134
C. The Early Vesting Rule
A second minority rule or "early vesting rule" has emerged,
which grants vesting even earlier than the traditional minority rule)"
Under this rule, a developer can obtain vesting as of the date of appli-
cation for a site-specific permit."6 States following this rule, which
128 Id. at 152-53.
1" Id. at 152.
1" See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I,
c.4.); Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 999-1000.
131 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307.
132 Id.
1 " Id.
134 See id.; Delaney, supra note 1, at 618-19; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at
1045, 1065.
135 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045-46. Commentators Gregory Over-
street and Diana Kirchheim dub this new rule the "Washington rule," but for this Note it
will be referred to as the "early vesting rule." Id. at 1095.
136 Id. at 1067. A growing minority of states are also enacting legislation authorizing
"development agreements," which are essentially contractual agreements between a devel-
oper and a municipality that a developer will be allowed to proceed with a given develop-
ment under the zoning ordinances in effect at the time the agreement is made. Delaney,
supra note 1, at 619-20. Where this type of agreement is authorized by statute, and is
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include Colorado, Massachusetts, Texas, and Washington, tend to im-
pose it by statute, not common law." 7 The state of Washington, how-
ever, is somewhat unique in having developed this rule by common
law, and later codifying it. 138
The Washington Supreme Court first departed from the permit
approval standard of the majority and minority rules over fifty years
ago. 139 In 1954, in State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, the court held
when a landowner files a building permit application, he acquires a
vested right to use his land in accordance with the current zoning
law."° In 1958, in Hull v. Hunt, the Washington Supreme Court re-
considered the merits of the majority rule, but then reaffirmed its
choice of earlier vesting. The court wrote:
Notwithstanding the weight of authority, we prefer to have
a date certain upon which the right vests to construct in ac-
cordance with the building permit. We prefer not to adopt a
rule which forces the court to search through... the 'moves
and countermoves of . . parties' ... to find that date upon
which the substantial change of position is made which
finally vests the right."'
The court dismissed the argument that such early vesting would
result in speculation in building permits, finding that the substantial
costs involved in preparing the applications would ensure that devel-
oper had a good faith intent to proceed. 142 The court also noted that
because such permits expire after six months, applicants would lose
their protection if they did not proceed with construction promptly. 143
Despite the popularity of the majority rule, the court clearly preferred
signed relatively early in the development process, it can afford a developer considerably
more protection than an early vesting rule. Id. at 619-21. However, where such agreements
are not authorized by statute, they may not always be enforceable. Id. at 619-20.
137 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-68-101 to106 (West, WESTLAW through 2001
1st Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000); TF.x. Loc. GOVT CODE ANN.
§ 245.002-006 (Vernon 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.27.095, 58.17.033 (West,
WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.).
'38 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. N19.27.095, 58.17.033 (West, WESTLAW through 2000
2t1 Spec. Sess.); Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 943 P.2d 1378, 1381-82 (Wash. 1997).
I" State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 275 P.2d 899, 902 (Wash. 1954); see Overstreet
& Kirchheim, sitigra note 1, at 1074-75.
14° Id. at 902.
191 331 P.2d 856, 859 (Wash. 1958).
192 Id.
143 Id.
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a rule that granted vesting upon the filing of a permit application, not
the time of its approval. 144
In 1987, the Washington legislature codified and expanded
Ogden's early vesting rule. 145 The statutes grant vesting as of the time
of submission of "valid and fully complete" application for a building
permit or for a preliminary or short plat approval. 146 Local govern-
ments may determine what constitutes a complete application. 147
Once vested, a developer is protected from any changes in the appli-
cable permit ordinance, zoning ordinance, or other land use control
ordinances.'"
Since the statutes were enacted, the Washington courts have con-
tinued to shape and expand Washington's early vesting rule through
their interpretation of the statutes, all the while emphasizing their
conscious choice to favor the developer. 149 Vested rights are now also
granted upon application for conditional use permits and planned
unit developtnents.'" Three cases in particular demonstrate the
courts' judicial refinement of the statutory rule: Erickson & Associates
v. McLerran, Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, and Westside Business Park
v. Pierce County. 151
In the first case, the Washington Supreme Court identified a
point in time that was too early, even in Washington, to grant vest-
ing. 152 In 1994, in Erickson & Associates, the Washington Supreme
Court held that the filing of a master use permit did not trigger vested
rights protection.' After the developer submitted a master use per-
mit application, but before it was approved, the city adopted an ordi-
nance restricting development in environmentally sensitive areas. 154
First, the court observed that review of master use permits is a process
144 See id.
145 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.27.095, 58.17.033 (West, WESTLAW through 2000 2d
Spec. Sess.); Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1382; Adams v. Thurston County, 855 1'.2d 284,
287 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); Ogden, 275 P.2d at 902; Overstreet & Kirchlteim, supra note 1,
at 1082-83.
149 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.27.095 (1) , 58.17.033(1).
147 Id. §§ 19.27.095(2) , 58.17.033(2).
148 /d. §§ 19.27.095(1), 58.17.033(1).
149 See Erickson & Assoc., Inc. v. McLerran, 872 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wash. 1994); Adams,
855 P.2d at 287; Overstreet & Kirchheitn, supra note 1, at 1083-89.
15° Ass'n of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 4 P.3d 115, 119 (Wash. 2000); Weyer-
haeuser v. Pierce County, 976 P.2d 1279, 1286 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
151 Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1386-87; Erickson & Assoc., 872 P.2d at 1096; Westside
Bus. Park v. Pierce County, 5 P.3d 713, 717-18 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
152 See Erickson &' Assoc., 872 P.2d at 1095-96.
1" Id. at 1096-97.
164 Id. at 1092.
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of evolution. 155 The developer begins the process with a general idea,
refining it over time in response to the city's feedback. 156 Second, the
court explained that its vested rights rule does not require local gov-
ernments to review all permit applications in light of the law in effect
at the time of filing. 157
 Finally, the court noted that granting vested
rights too easily subverts the public interest. 155
Taking these factors in consideration, the court found that mas-
ter use permit applications were submitted so early in the develop-
ment process that the developer would not have yet demonstrated the
necessary commitment to complete the project. 159 That lack of com-
mitment undermined the doctrine's goal of avoiding permit specula-
tion.160 In addition, at such an early stage, the developer's plans were
not concrete enough to deserve protection from enforcement of new
community needs. 161 Therefore, the court held that only when ac-
companied by a building permit application would a master use per-
mit application possess the requisite commitment and detail to war-
rant vested rights protection. 162
In its next important vesting case, the Washington Supreme
Court began its more recent trend of expanding the early vesting rule
through its interpretation of the statutes. 163 In 1997, in Noble Manor
Co., the court held that when developers vest under the statute, they
gain the right to develop their land according to the use disclosed in
their application. 164 Noble Manor Company ("Noble Manor") filed a
short plat application for subdivision which stated its intention to
build residential duplexes. 155 Before approving the application and
subdividing the land, the county enacted a new zoning law which in-
creased the minimum lot size for duplexes. 166 When Noble Manor
tried to submit building permit applications, the county denied them
on the grounds that the lot sizes were inadequate for duplexes. 167 On
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Erickson & Assoc., 872 P.2d at 1095.
156 Id. at 1095-96.
159 Id. at 1096.
160 See id.
'6' See id. at 1095-96.
162 See Erickson & Assoc., 872 P.2d at 1096.
163
 See Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1385-86.
164 Id. at 1387.
165 Id. at 1380. For the sake of brevity, I have simplified the facts in a way which does
not materially affect the issue presented to the court or its discussion and decision.
166 Id.
167 id.
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appeal, Noble Manor claimed that when ii submitted the short plat
application it gained a vested right to develop the land, whereas the
county claimed that Noble Manor had only vested in the right to sub-
divide the land. 168
The court first reiterated that the purpose of the early vesting
rule was to give developers certainty as to what zoning laws would be
applied to their development projects, and to protect their invest-
ment. 1166 Concluding that the right to subdivide would be meaningless
without the right to develop, the court held that the legislature in-
tended the statutory vested rights protection to include the right to
develop, not just subdivide, land)" The court then found that appli-
cants with vested rights only gained the right to develop uses disclosed
in their applications."' The court based its decision on the statutory
language which granted developers the right to have "their applica-
tion" processed according to the existing zoning law, and the legisla-
ture's intent to protect developers' expectations, but to discourage
speculation in permits. 172 The court rejected the county's argument
that Noble Manor's use should not be protected at this stage be cause
the county did not consider the intended use when reviewing the
short plat application, instead granting Noble Manor the right to pro-
ceed on the grounds that its application stated its intention to develop
residential duplexes.'"
In 2000, in Westside Business Park, the Washington Court of Ap-
peals broadened the Noble Manor Co. doctrine when it held that even
verbal disclosure of use could be sufficient to secure vested rights pro-
tection. 174 After meeting with county officials to discuss their pro-
posed project, the developers of Westside Business Park ("Westside")
filed a short plat application which delineated two lots, but indicated
no other improvements whatsoever. 175 The county subsequently
amended its zoning regulations to add new storm drainage require-
tnents. 176 When the developers asked the county for permission to
proceed with their business park under the zoning laws in effect at
the time they submitted their short plat application, the county de-
169 Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1381.
169 Id. at 1383.
17° Id. at 1384.
' 71 Id. at 1385.
1179 Id. at 1386.
179 Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1386.
114 Westside Bus. Park, 5 P.M at 717.
175 Id. at 715.
176 id
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nied it, later pointing out to the court that the application did not
specify the intended use, in accordance with Noble Manor Co. 177
The court faulted the county for not requiring developers to dis-
close their intended use in their applications, which the county had
statutory authority to do. 1" The court, therefore, found that
Westside's developers had disclosed their intentions the only way they
could—through discussions with county officials.'" The court, there-
fore, held that under the circumstances the developers had disclosed
their use in a manner sufficient to warrant vested rights protection. 180
Washington is not alone in granting vested rights protection at
the time of application filing."' Colorado recently revised its vested
rights statute to change it from a minority rule statute to an early vest-
ing statute. 182
 Massachusetts grants broad vested rights protection as
of the time of application for definitive subdivision plan approval, for
a period of 8 years from the time of approval.'" Texas enacted its cur-
rent statute in 1987, granting vesting as of the time a permit applica-
tion is filed.'" Early vesting was not yet the absolute rule in Texas,
however, because local governments were permitted to grant vested
rights in stages for multi-permit projects.' Then, in 1995, the legisla-
ture amended the statute to state that all permits required for a proj-
ect should be evaluated under the laws in effect at the time of applica-
tion for the first permit.'"
II. CRITICISM
Despite the apparent diversity between the three vested rights
rules, commentators have not universally praised any one as providing
an ideal solution to the vested rights dilemma. 187 The majority and
177 Id. at 715-16.
178 See id. at 716-17.
179 Westside Bus. Pat*, 5 P.3d at 717.
180 Id.
181
 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1067-69.
182 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-68-101 to 106 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 1st
Reg. Sess.); Levy, supra note 28, at 83-84.
183
 Mass. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000). The zoning law grants this same protection
upon application for preliminary subdivision approval, so long as the preliminary plan is
followed by a definitive plan within seven months. Id.
184 TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 245.002-006 (Vernon 1999); Hartman, supra note
98, at 312. The statute was accidentally repealed in 1997, and then reinstated in 1999. TEx.
Loc. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 245.002-006; Hartman, supra note 48, at 317.
183 Hartman, supra note 48, at 313-15.
188 MX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 295.002; Hartman, supra note 48, at 315-16.
187 See infra notes 190-222 and accompanying text.
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minority rules are criticized primarily for being unfair to developers,
whereas the early-vesting rule is criticized for being unfair to the local
government. 188 One of the few things the rules have in common is
that they all make someone unhappy.'"
Courts and academics alike have thoroughly criticized the major-
ity rule for granting its protection in an untimely and uncertain man-
ner.'" It has been called "arbitrary," "inefficient," 191 and the "hand-
maiden of ... administrative anarchy." 192 The harshest criticism of the
rule usually arises in the context of multi-phase, multi-building proj-
ects which are typically very expensive and lengthy undertakings; this
setting seems to accentuate the rule's weaknesses.'" Even the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals, in a case decided on other grounds,
acknowledged in dicta that their majority rule may not work well in
that context.'"
The majority rule was originally developed at a time when most
construction consisted of single building projects on single parcels,
therefore requiring only one permit—the building permit. 195 Al-
though the rule in that context does provide a measure of certainty
and objectivity, in modern land development such approval is issued
very late in the planning process. 196 Developers of large projects are
typically required to secure numerous local government approvals
before the building permit, often requiring substantial expenditures
on surveys, environmental studies, architectural drawings, and other
188 See infra notes 190-222 and accompanying text.
189 See infra notes 190-222 and accompanying text.
I" See, e.g., W. Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388,395 (Utah 1980) ("In our
view the [majority rule] tends to subject landowners to undue and even calamitous ex-
pense because of changing city councils or zoning boards or their dilatory action and to
the unpredictable results of burdensome litigation. [1t] permits an unlimited right to deny
permits when ordinances are amended after application and preliminary work."); Delaney,
supra note 76, at 384-85 ("application of the [majority] rule hai led to a hodge-podge of
ad-hoc, case-by-case decision making by the judiciary.... The situation is unsatisfactory for
everyone involved, including developers and lending institutions as well as public agen-
cies.").
lin Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710.
192 Raley v. Cal. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699,711 (1977).
I" See Delaney, supra note 1, 603-04; see, e.g., Raley, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 702-03,711-12.
194 Rockshire Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, 358 A.2d 570,579 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
188 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 626-27; Delaney, supra note 1, at 603-
04.
190 See W Land Equities, Inc., 617 P.2d at 395; Delaney, supra note 1, at 608.
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planning tools. 197 If a local government makes a significant change in
the zoning law after developers have made this investment, but before
they have secured a building permit, the developers stand to lose con-
siderable sums of money. 198
The rule is particularly onerous for developers of large-scale pro-
jects who prefer to proceed in phases, securing building permits and
commencing construction on one stage before proceeding to the
next. 199 If, for example, the local government amended the minimum
lot size ordinance after issuing the building permits for the first
phase, but before issuing the permits for other phases, the developer
could be forced to alter his plans for the remaining phases to con-
form to the amended ordinance.") The majority rule could not pro-
tect such a developer on the basis of the issuance of just one building
permit, because securing one permit and commencing construction
on one unit out of many would not constitute substantial reliance." )
Requiring such a developer to secure all the building permits and
commence construction on the entire project at once, however, seems
unreasonably burdensome. 202
The minority rule for vested rights is popular among states with
vesting statutes, but receives much of the same criticism directed at
the majority rule."' The rule's advocates claim it provides the best
balance between protecting the developer's investment and expecta-
tions while still allowing the local government enough flexibility to
protect the public interest. 204 They argue that it allows the local gov-
ernment to enforce zoning changes up until the time of permit ap-
proval and then merely binds the government to its decision.205
Critics of the rule, however, claim that it suffers from many of the
same flaws as the majority rule 206 They point out that a developer
must make a substantial investment in land acquisition, design and
197 See Bd. of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Va. 1972);
Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710, Delaney, supra note 76, at 414.
199 See Delaney & Kominers, supra note 77, at 241-48 (discussing the harshness of the
majority rule in the context of various types of large-scale development projects).
199 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 615.
299 See id.
291 See id.
202
 See id.
203 See id. at 619; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1065-66; Prichard & Riegle,
supra note 7, at 1001.
204 Rinaldi, supra note 7, at 104.
205 Id. at 94; see Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 1009.
296
 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1065; see Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7,
at 1001.
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engineering work, application preparation, and response to commu-
nity concerns, all before approval of a site specific plan. 207 In addition,
knowing that their decisions will be rendered final by vested rights,
local governments may require that such applications contain more
detailed information, increasing the preparation costs for the devel-
oper.208 This leaves the developer in the same vulnerable financial po-
sition if the local government decides to amend the ordinance before
approving the application. 209
Like the minority rule, the early vesting rule has strong support-
ers, but is also not without critics.") One pair of commentators touts
the early vesting rule as "ahead of its time" in successfully finding the
balance between landowners' desire for certainty and local govern-
ments' desire for flexibility. 211 They claim that the rule permits local
governments to exercise their zoning powers in good faith, while
prohibiting bad faith actions in response to community opposition to
a proposed development.212 The rule accomplishes this by preserving
local governments' power to amend zoning ordinances as needed, but
preventing them from enforcing those changes against pending per-
mit applications.215 The rule also preserves local governments'
flexibility by leaving them free to impose moratoria on applications
when the need arises to reevaluate their zoning schemes. 214 In addi-
tion, the rule protects the public interest because all permits granted
under it will expire eventually, preventing developers who do not pro-
ceed promptly from vesting indefinitely. 215
Another commentator, however, suggests that the balance is per-
haps less than optimal for all parties when he notes that "developers
have a sweet deal" under the early vesting rule. 216 Whereas the major-
ity and minority rules are criticized for slighting developers, the early
vesting rule is criticized for giving short shrift to the public interest. 217
207 See Bisgaier & Marcuse, supra note 88, at 14-15; Overstreet & Kirchheina, supra note
1, at 1065.
208 Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 1004.
2w See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1065.
'210 Id. at 1047, 1073 (praising fairness and certainty of early vesting rule); Wynne, supra
note 8, at 939 (arguing that Washington's early vesting rule is no longer fair or certain).
m Overstreet & Kirchheitn, supra note 1, at 1047.
212 See id. at 1060, 1073.
213 See id.
214 See id. at 1060.
215 See id.
216 Wynne,
	 suPra note 8, at 932.
217 See id. at 855, 921 (arguing that early vesting can come at expense of public inter-
est); supra notes 190-209 and accompanying text.
958	 Boston College Law Review	 (Vol. 43:935
One of the primary concerns is that it locks in the zoning laws for a
particular development far earlier than is appropriate 218
Such early vesting can result in the building of large-scale proj-
ects under decade old ordinances. 219 One critic argues that this cre-
ates an unreasonable restraint on local governments' ability to keep
zoning ordinances in step with changing community needs and new
understanding of development impacts 2 2° Ordinance amendments
enacted shortly after an application is filed may not be targeted at the
particular development at all, but may represent a sincere local gov-
ernment response to an important community issue. 221 Freezing the
zoning law in that case bestows an unwarranted benefit on a devel-
oper who has not demonstrated any serious intention to proceed with
the proposed projects. 222
In summary, it is clear that despite the variety of vesting options
on the table, none pleases all parties concerned.225 Given the stakes
involved, and the inherently conflicting nature of the interests con-
cerned, some degree of dissatisfaction is probably unavoidable. Nev-
ertheless, the next section considers whether an analysis of the scope
of vesting, an element missing from much of the current debate,
could contribute positively to the discourse. 224
III. SCOPE OF RIGHTS GRANTED AND A SPECTRUM
APPROACH TO VESTING
Legal opinions and academic articles have discussed certain as-
pects of the vested rights doctrine extensively, yet there has been very
little discussion of the scope of rights granted when vesting is
achieved.225
 The general assumption under all three versions of the
2111 See Wynne, supra note 8, at 855,921.
219
 Hartman, supra note 48, at 320; see Wynne, supra note 8, at 921.
229
 Wynne, supra note 8, at 855.
221 See Heeter, supra note 2, at 94.
222 See Wynne, supra note 8, at 916.
225 See supra notes 190-222 and accompanying text.
224 See infra notes 225-338 and accompanying text.
225
 Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402-03. But cf. Cunningham & Kremer, supra
note 1, at 710-29 (recommending a new rule which incorporates a consideration of the
scope of vesting). See generally Delaney, supra note 1 (focusing on topics such as timing of
vesting, substantial reliance, and application of vesting to large-scale developments);
Heeter, supra note 2 (focusing on topics such as legal theory of vesting doctrine and sub-
stantial reliance tests), Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1 (focusing mainly on timing of
vesting); Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7 (focusing on advantages and disadvantages of
minority rule); Wynne, supra note 8 (focusing on criticism of early vesting rule).
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vested rights doctrine is that the outcome will be all-or-nothing. 226 In
other words, once developers gain vested rights, they are exempt from
almost any change in the zoning law, but if they fail to gain vested
rights, they receive no protection at 3,11. 227 The fact that the vested
rights debate operates under this assumption forces it to remain my-
opically focused on timing, the only remaining significant variable. 228
As a result, the three rules that have developed differ primarily on the
choice of timing.229 The problem with these rules and their all-or-
nothing outcome is that they create a zero sum game between the de-
veloper and the public interest. 2" Because the rules predetermine
that either the developer will receive full protection and the local
government will be precluded from applying new zoning laws to the
project, or the developer will receive no protection and the local gov-
ernment will be allowed to apply any new zoning laws to the project,
there is no room for a compromise solution. 231
Examining the relationship between disclosure of developers'
intentions and the scope of protection granted is one way to alter the
focus of the debate and provide some additional solutions to the
vested rights problem.232 When courts seek to determine whether it is
an appropriate time to grant a developer vested rights protection,
they implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, consider the degree to which
the developer has disclosed his intentions to the local government. 233
If the degree of disclosure were tied to the scope of protection
granted, courts and legislatures could grant vested rights along a spec-
trum, instead of being constrained by the all-or-nothing outcome. 234
Under such an analysis, developers who disclose virtually all the de-
tails of their projects might receive broad protection from almost any
228 See infra notes 240-267 and accompanying text.
227 See infra notes 240-267 and accompanying text.
228 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 39 app. I at 40-
44; Overstreet 8c Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045,1065,1067.
229 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 39 app. 1 at 40-
44; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045,1065,1067.
2s° See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 707,710 (criticizing the zero sum game
result in the context of the majority rule).
231 See id, at 710-11 (discussing this dilemma in the context of the majority rule).
232 See id. at 723 (suggesting a "Rule of Irrevocable Commitment" which incorporates a
consideration of the plans disclosed by the developer); Wynne, supra note 8, at 911-12
(suggesting that. the scope of rights granted to a developer be limited to the use disclosed
in the permit application).
233 See infra notes 283-293 and accompanying text.
234 See infra notes 295-338 and accompanying text.
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zoning ordinance changes. 235 By comparison, developers who disclose
very few details about their projects would be protected from changes
in only a few zoning ordinances—those implicated by whatever disclo-
sure they made. 236 Although such an analysis will not solve all the
problems inherent in the vested rights doctrine, it would mitigate the
impact of the present rules by creating a solution that resembles more
of a compromise than a strict win and loss. 237 Creating space for a
compromise solution might also encourage more mediation and less
litigation.238
A. Scope of Rights Granted and the All -or-Nothing-Result
A review of the statutes and common law decisions discussed ear-
lier illustrates the all-or-nothing scope of rights granted under the
three vested rights rules. 239 The scope of vesting under the majority
rule is clearly all-or-nothing. 24° As Prince George's County v. Equitable
Trust Co., demonstrated, when developers acquire vested rights under
the majority rule, their entire project is protected from all subsequent
zoning changes.241 Courts grant this complete protection regardless of
whether the project could be adapted to conform to the new ordi-
nance. 242 The Equitable Trust Co. court granted the developer a vested
right to proceed because he had already obtained a building permit
and had begun construction of the building. 243 The court made no
mention of whether the partially completed construction could be or
should be adapted to conform to the new ordinance; once vesting was
granted, all the zoning laws were effectively frozen in time for that
development. 244
Conversely, Avco Community Developers v. South Coastal Regional
Commission demonstrated that when developers lose under the major-
ity rule, their projects remain subject to any newly enacted zoning or-
233 See infra notes 300-303 and accompanying text.
236 See infra notes 300-303 and accompanying text.
237 See infra notes 327-334 and accompanying text.
238 See infra notes 335-338 and accompanying text.
239 See infra notes 240-267 and accompanying text.
24° Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710.
241
 408 A.2d 737,742-43 (Md. 1979); Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710.
242 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710; see, e.g., Equitable Trust Co., 408 A.2d at
742-43.
243 Equitable Trust Co., 408 A.2d at 742-43.
244
 See id.
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dinance.245 This remains true until the developer gains vested rights
status, regardless of the fact that adapting the project to a new ordi-
nance may negate hundreds of thousands of dollars spent on prelimi-
nary planning and site preparation.248 The Avco court held that be-
cause the developer had not applied for any building permits, it could
not grant the developer any exemption from subsequent zoning law
changes.247
The scope of vesting is not quite as clear under the minority rule,
although in general it is probably as broad as under the majority rule,
once granted. 248 The New Jersey statute, for example, appears to grant
all-or-nothing vesting, like the majority rule.249 According to the stat-
ute, a developer with vested rights under a final site plan approval is
protected from changes to the "zoning requirements applicable to the
preliminary approval first granted." 2" As noted earlier, the New Jersey
Supreme Court said that the purpose of the statute is to protect the
developer from "changes in zoning law." 251 Implicitly, the reverse is
also true, as illustrated by the outcome of Lake Shore Estates, Inc. v.
Denville Township Planning Board—before a project receives local gov-
ernment approval, and thereby vests, the court will not protect it from
any changes in the zoning law.252
Before its statute was enacted, Virginia's common law minority
rule was somewhat unclear as to the scope of rights granted upon
vesting.253 In Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Medical Structures,
the Virginia Supreme Court granted the developer a "vested right to
the land use described in the use permit."254 Because the issue in the case
was whether the developer was protected from a new ordinance pro-
"5 553 P.2d 546, 551-54 (Cal. 1976); see also Prince George's County v. Sunrise Dev.
Ltd. P'ship, 623 A.2d 1296, 1304-05 (Md. 1993) (development subject to rezoning from
multifamily high-density residential to multifamily medium-density residential); Equitable
post Co., 408 A.2d at 742-43 (parcel subject to rezoning from commercial use to residen-
tial use).
246 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710.
447 Am Cnigy. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 551.
248 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-49(a), 40:55D-52(a) (West, WESTLAW through
L.2001, c.100); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I,
c.4.).
249 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-49(a), 40:55D-52(a) (West, WESTLAW through
L.2001, c.I00).
250 Id. § 40:55D-52 (a) .
251 Palatine I v. Planning Bd., 628 A.2d 321, 325 (N.J. 1993).
252 See 605 A.2d 1106, 1111-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
253 See Bd. of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Va. 1972)
(holding only addressed right to land use).
254 Id. (emphasis added).
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hibiting his proposed use, the ruling left open the question whether
the developer gained protection from any subsequent change in the
zoning law.255
 The Virginia courts were, however, clear that when vest-
ing failed, developers received no protection. 256 In Board of Supervisors
v. Trollingwood Partnership, the court denied any vested rights protec-
tion to a developer who had not received approval for the third phase
of his project, despite the fact that he had received approval for the
first two phases and had begun construction on those phases.257 Vir-
ginia's statutory minority rule appears to grant a broad scope of vest-
ing when it states that developers will be protected from "a subse-
quent amendment to a zoning ordinance."258
States following the early vesting rule generally allow broad vest-
ing in virtually any land use control law.259 Washington's statute, for
example, protects developers from changes in the building permit
ordinance or subdivision or short plat ordinance "and the zoning or
other land use control ordinances in effect on the date of applica-
tion."260 Case law suggests that this may be limited by the uses dis-
closed to the local government.261 In both Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce
County and Westside Business Park v. Pierce County, Washington courts
only protected the developers from changes in zoning laws which af-
fected the use they disclosed, although the court was clearly very leni-
ent about the manner of disclosure. 262 The authors of one article ex-
tensively examining Washington's rule conclude, however, that "any
265 See id.
256
 Bd. of Supervisors v. Trollingwood P'ship, 445 S.E.2d 151, 152-53 (Va. 1994) (third
phase of project not protected from rezoning because developer had not obtained ap-
proval for that phase); Notestein v. Bd. of Supervisors, 393 S.E.2d 205, 207-08 (Va. 1990)
(because owners had not received any permit approval, parcel was subject to rezoning
which prohibited owner's proposed development).
257
 See445 S.E.2d at 152-53.
266 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2001 Spec. Sess. I, c.4.)
2" See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-68-102.5 (West, WESTLAW through 2001 1st
Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000); Teat. Loc. Gov't . CODE ANN. § 245.002
(Vernon 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.27.095(1), 58.17.033(1) (West, WESTLAW
through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.); Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1086 (discussing
Washington's early vesting rule).
266 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.27.095(1), 58.17.033(1) (West, WESTLAW through
2000 2d Spec. Sess.).
261 See Westside Bus. Park v. Pierce County, 5 P.3d 713, 717 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)
("therefore it was vested with regard to that use"); Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 943
P.2d 1378, 1386 (Wash. 1997) ("applicant should have the right to have the uses disclosed
in their application considered ... under the laws in existence at the time of the applica-
tion").
462 Westside Bus. Park, 5 P.3d at 717; Noble Manor Co., 943 P.2d at 1386.
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standard that exerts a restraining or directing influence over land use
. . . is a land use control ordinance that statutorily vests." 263
Other states following the early vesting rule also grant relatively
broad vesting. 264 Texas' early vesting statute provides that in the case
of a development which requires a series of permits, the developer
gains vested rights in all the existing zoning regulations as of the date
of the original application for the first permit. 265 Similarly, according
to the Massachusetts zoning statute, when a developer files a definitive
plan, "the land shown on such plan shall be governed by the applica-
ble provisions of the zoning ordinance or by-law" in effect at the time
of application.266 Massachusetts, therefore, has perhaps the broadest
scope of vesting, protecting the land itself from any changes in the
zoning law, not just the proposed development project. 267
Clearly then, none of the versions of the early vesting rule places
significant limits on the scope of the protection granted. 268 The usual
outcome is all-or-nothing, like the majority and minority rules. 269 This
"all" is granted at such an early stage in the development process,
however, that the possibility of "nothing" is not a significant factor for
developers. 27°
The problem with an all-or-nothing outcome is that it creates a
zero sum game: either the court grants the developer total protection
and precludes the local government from enforcing any new zoning
legislation against the project, or the developer receives no protection
and the local government has free reign to subject the project to new
restrictions. 271 When the developer receives the "all" outcome, it
263 Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1086 (internal quotations omitted); cf.
Wynne, supra note 8, at 873 (arguing that Washington's early vesting rule grants protection
from at least all zoning ordinances and other ordinances requiring land use approvals, but
suggesting that the law is unclear with regard to health and safety regulations and proce-
dural land use requirements, and does not provide protection from impact fees).
'' See, e.g., MASS. Gm LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000); Thx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 245.002 (Vernon 1999).
265 Thx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 245.002 (Vernon 1999).
266 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2000).
267 See id, § 6.
269 See supra notes 259-267 and accompanying text.
269 See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1073; Wynne, supra note 8, at 856-57,
916.
29° See Delaney & Kominers, supra note 77, at 232; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note
1, at 1073; Wynne, supra note 8, at 916.
271 See Cunningham & Kretner, supra note 1, at 707, 710; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855-
56.
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comes at the community's expense. 272 This is particularly true when a
project is in an early enough stage that the developer could reasona-
bly bring it into compliance with the new zoning restriction. 275 The
outcome seems particularly unfair under the early vesting rule, where
a lengthy project could receive full vesting protection in zoning laws
which are nearly a decade old by project completion.274
When developers receive the "nothing" outcome, particularly in a
majority rule state, they may lose all their investment Y 75 Under the
majority rule, local governments can pull the rug out from under de-
velopers who do not have building permits, even going so far as re-
zoning the site to prohibit a developer's intended use. 276 The all-or-
nothing outcome under the majority and minority rule place local
governments in a powerful bargaining position, because developers
are desperate to get their permits issued so that they can vest in the
current law.277
 Further, the possibility of a "nothing" result encourages
developers to present large proposals as a single, massive project, in-
stead of a phased, or staged, development, so that they can vest in the
entire project at the same time. 278
Because the three rules generally award the same scope of rights
upon vesting—complete protection from changes in the zoning law—
the distinguishing feature between them is their choice of timing: ear-
lier or later in the developer process. 279
 Statute or common law
precedent, therefore, binds courts to render a decision according to
one of the three timing rules. 286 Nevertheless, courts and legislatures
seem to implicitly recognize that a relationship exists between a de-
272 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710, 714; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855-
56.
2" See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710, 726-27; Hanes & Minchew, supra
note 28, at 402-03.
274 See Hartman, supra note 48, at 320; Wynne, supra note 8, at 921.
215 Raley v. Cal. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 711-12 (1977) (un-
der the majority rule "many entrepreneurs run out of money"); W. Land Equities v. City of
Logan, 617 P.24 388, 395 (Utah 1980) (majority rule can "subject landowners to undue
and even calamitous expense"); Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710; Overstreet &
Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1063.
276
 See, e.g., Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.24 at 551.
277 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 710-11; see Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra
note 1, at 1064.
278 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 711; see Delaney, supra note 1, at 615.
279 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 619; Delaney & Vaias, supra note 4, at 39 app. I at 40-
44; Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1045, 1065, 1067.
280 See, e.g., Arica Gutty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 551; Lake Shore Estates, Inc., 605 A.2d
at 1111.
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veloper's disclosure and their ability to award vesting rights. 281 Courts
frequently discuss how much information the developer has disclosed
about the project as a means of justifying their decision either to
grant or deny vested rights protection. 282
In two of the majority rule cases discussed earlier, the courts
linked the developers' disclosure of their plans to the appropriateness
of granting vested rights protection. 288 The California Supreme Court
made this point explicitly in Avco when it held that it could not grant
vested rights status to the development because the developer had not
submitted detailed plans to the county and therefore had not fully
disclosed his building plans to the county. 284 In Prince George's County v.
Sunrise Development Ltd. Partnership, the Maryland Court of Appeals,
while outlining the developer's work on the project to date, stated
that "structural, construction, or detail drawings of the high-rise
building have never been prepared."285 This pointed observation, to-
gether with the court's holding that vested rights could not be
granted short of the commencement of construction to a degree that
was apparent to the general public, imply that this court was also look-
ing for full disclosure before granting vested rights protection. 286 By
the time building construction was apparent to the public, the devel-
oper necessarily would have fully disclosed his plans to the local gov-
ernment. 287
Similarly, the Virginia Supreme Court, in applying the minority
rule, has implied that disclosure is somehow linked to the appropri-
ateness of vesting. 2" The Medical Structures, Inc. court, in explaining its
decision to grant vested right protection, emphasized the amount of
information available to the local government by virtue of the site
plan application, which the developer had submitted in addition to
the special use permit. 2" Conversely, the Trollingwood Partnership
court, in explaining its decision to deny vested rights protection,
251 See infra notes 283-293 and accompanying text.
282 See infra notes 283-290 and accompanying text.
wo See Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 552; Sunrise Deu Ltd. P'ship, 623 A.2d at
1298, 1304.
284 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc., 553 P.2d at 552.
228 623 A.2d at 1298.
2E6 See id. at 1298, 1304.
"7 See id.
288 See Medical Structures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d at 801.
1" Id.
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noted the lack of information available to the local government about
the details of the project's final phase. 29°
Even Washington's early vesting statute recognizes a relationship
between disclosure and vesting because it allows local governments
some control over the amount of disclosure required at the time pro-
tection is granted. 291 Under the statute, vested rights are granted at
the time of filing a complete permit application, and local govern-
ments are given some power to determine what constitutes a com-
plete application. 292 Therefore, they can to some extent determine
how much information must be disclosed before a developer can se-
cure vested rights. 293 Although courts and legislatures clearly recog-
nize a relationship between disclosure and the scope of rights vested,
none have yet considered how that relationship might be used to de-
velop a more flexible approach to vested rights. 294
B. A Spectrum Approach to Vesting
Developing this link between disclosure and the granting of
vested rights protection could potentially give the vested rights doc-
trine a new dimension of flexibility, by shifting the focus from a pure
timing analysis. 295 A few commentators, recommending improvements
to the vested rights doctrine, have suggested ways that courts and leg-
islatures could adjust the scope of vested rights protection granted
based on considerations of disclosure. 296 For example, one pair of
authors suggest a new vesting rule based on the financial commitment
a developer has made to a project, but which considers several factors,
including the plans disclosed by the developer, in its consideration of
29°
 TroRingwood Pship, 445 S.E.2d at 152-53 (noting that developer had not submitted
required detailed plans for third phase).
291 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.27.095(1)—(2), 58.17.033(1)—(2) (West, WESTLAW
through 2000 2d Spec. Sess.).
292 id.
293 See id.
294 See supra notes 283-293 and accompanying text.
295 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723; Wynne, supra note 8, at 911-12.
296 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723 (suggesting a "Rule of Irrevocable
Commitment" which incorporates a consideration of the plans disclosed by the devel-
oper); Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402-03 (suggesting that developers should vest
in laws which govern the project as outlined in their subdivision or site plan, but not nec-
essarily in any change in the law whatsoever); Levy, supra note 28, at 85 (suggesting that
Colorado counties devise permit processes which grant vesting upon submission of appli-
cations that satisfy the counties' need for information and flexibility); Wynne, supra note 8,
at 911-112 (suggesting that the scope of right granted to a developer be limited to the use
disclosed in the permit application).
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the scope of protection to be granted. 297 Another pair of authors sug-
gest that developers should at least vest in the zoning laws necessary
to protect their investment, which would include the laws governing
the details of the project disclosed in a permit application. 299 A third
commentator, writing in the context of subdivision applications, sug-
gests that the scope of rights granted to a developer be limited to the
use disclosed in the applieation. 299
These suggestions could be developed into a coherent analysis
which grants vested rights along a spectrum. 509
 Courts and legislatures
would expand or contract the scope of protection granted according
to the amount of information developers had disclosed about their
projects."' At one extreme, a developer who had disclosed full details
and plans for his project would receive protection from virtually any
changes in the zoning law. 302 At the other extreme, a developer who
had disclosed few details, perhaps only the proposed use, would only
be protected from changes in a few zoning ordinances—only those
which implicated his choice of use." 3
At the two extremes, the spectrum would resemble the tradi-
tional "all" and "nothing" choice of outcomes, but the flexibility
would come in the presence of a middle ground: the more developers
disclose about their projects, the more zoning laws in which they
would vest. 304 Or, in other words, the more local governments know
about what projects are going to look like, the less they can enforce
new zoning laws against them. 3D5 For states preferring not to leave this
decision up to the courts on a case by case basis, the legislature could
impose this spectrum statutorily, by defining the scope of protection
291 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 715,722-23.
2" Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402-03.
29g Wynne, supra note 8, at 911-12.
390 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723; Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28,
at 402-03; Levy, supra note 28, at 85; Wynne, supra note 8, at 911-12; see infra notes 301-
325 and accompanying text.
301 See infra notes 302-318 and accompanying text.
302 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 722-23; Hanes & Minchew, supra note
28, at 402-03; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893-94,897.
"3 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 722-23; Hanes & Minchew, supra note
28, at 402-03; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893-94,897.
394 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 722-23; Hanes & Minchew, supra note
28, at 402-03; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893-94,897.
303 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 722-23; Delaney, supra note 1, at 622;
Hanes & Minchew, supra note 28, at 402-03; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893-94,897.
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granted to each level of permit application or approval in the devel-
opment process."
For example, a majority rule case like Sunrise Development Ltd.
Partnership would have a better outcome for the developer under a
spectrum vesting analysis." In that case, the developer had submitted
and received approval for a site plan which disclosed his intention to
build high-density multi-family units." Although the developer had
also received a building permit, the court held that the amount of
construction completed was not substantial enough at the time the
land was downzoned to medium-density multi-family units." As a re-
sult, the developer received no protection. 310 Under a spectrum vest-
ing analysis, however, because the developer had disclosed and re-
ceived approval for his intended use, that project would be protected
from the new restriction to medium-density housing. 311 The developer
would not, however, receive blanket protection from changes in the
zoning law, because he had not disclosed the details of the build-
ings.312
 Therefore, until such disclosure, the local government would
be able to enforce changes in the zoning laws applicable to the con-
struction of high-density multi-family units. 313
Similarly, an early vesting rule case like Westside Business Park
would have a better outcome for the local government under a spec-
trum vesting analysis. 514 In that case, the developer had submitted a
short plat application merely outlining two lots, and had orally dis-
305 See Wynne, supra note 8, at 893-94, 897, 911-12. For example, presently Washing-
ton's statute appears to protect developers with vested rights from virtually any change in
the zoning law which relates to the use disclosed in the developer's application. See WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.27.095(1), 58.17.033(1) (West, WESTLAW through 2000 2d Spec.
Sess.). This is a much broader protection than would be granted under a spectrum vesting
approach, where the protection would he limited to changes in the zoning laws which are
actually implicated by details disclosed in the application. For example, under a spectrum
vesting approach, a developer who had submitted a subdivision application only showing
lot lines would have a protected right to subdivide the land, but would not vest in the
building height ordinance, since the application did not disclose the intended building
height.
30
 623 A.2d at 1296-1305.
548 Id. at 1297-98.
389 Id. at 1304-05.
910 Id.
311 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723-24; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893-94,
897.
SIC Sunrise Deu Ltd. P'ship, 623 A.2d at 1298; seeCunningharn & Kremer, supra note 1, at
723-24.
313 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723-24; Hanes & Minchew, supra note
28, at 403; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893-94, 897.
314 Westside Bus. Park, 5 P.M at 713-19.
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closed to local government officials his intention to build a business
park. 313 Because the developer had orally disclosed his intended use,
the court awarded the developer full vested rights protection, includ-
ing protection from a recent change in the county's storm drainage
requirements. 316 Under a spectrum vesting analysis., however, because
the developer had not yet disclosed the details of his building plans
and site layout, which would take into consideration storm drainage
requirements, he would not be protected from a change in those re-
quirements. 317 The developer would not necessarily, however, be left
with the "nothing" outcome; if the court was willing to count the oral
disclosure of use as legally sufficient, the developer would still be pro-
tected from any change in the zoning law which might prohibit use of
the land as a business park.'"
As these two examples demonstrate, a spectrum analysis gives the
developer some protection, the local government some flexibility, and
avoids the harsh all-or-nothing outcome of the three current vested
rights rules.3" This type of analysis satisfies arguments made on both
sides of the current timing-focused vested rights debate. 32° On the
one hand, the more the local governments know about what develop-
ers intend to do, the less justification they have for attempting to en-
force new rules against their projects. 321 In addition, the more details
developers disclose about their proposed projects, the more time and
resources they have necessarily risked on the outcome, justifying a
commensurate level of protection in return. 322 On the other hand,
completely staying local governments' hand in the early stages of de-
velopment projects, when developers may have done nothing more
than draw lot lines on parcels, is unfair to the public interest.323 Not
only do local governments have no idea what the developers intend to
build, but the developers may also have committed very little capital
to the project and may themselves have only a vague idea of the future
515 Id. at 715.
316 Id, at 715-17.
.317 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723-24; Hanes & Minchew, supra note
28, at 403; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893-94,897.
518 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723-24; Hanes & Mincliew, supra note
28, at 403; Wynne, supra note 8, at 893-94,897.
518 See supra notes 307-318 and accompanying text.
328 See infra notes 321-325 and accompanying text.
521 See Delaney, supra note 1, at 622.
322 See Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 1001.
323 Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723; Hartman, supra note 48, at 320;
fleeter, supra note 2, at 94; Wynne, supra note 8, at 855.
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shape of their projects. 324 In that case, not allowing the community,
via the local government, to enforce changes in the zoning law seems
unfair. 325
Certainly some of the criticisms of the current three rules can
also be levied against a spectrum vesting analysis. 326 Unless statutes tie
the scope of protection to particular permit applications or approvals,
this type of analysis could leave developers in a somewhat uncertain
position vis-à-vis which laws they have vested in and which they have
not.527
 In common law jurisdictions, some developers and local gov-
ernments would still end up asking courts to determine their respec-
tive rights.328 Courts would have to determine what details were dis-
closed, what details were not, and what forms of disclosure would be
legally significant. 329
If vesting were tied to disclosure, developers would want to dis-
close more details earlier, increasing their up front development cost
for preparing plans and designs. 338
 In addition, such an analysis could
arguably still lead to permit speculation. 331 A developer could con-
ceivably file a very preliminary application which disclosed the in-
tended use, say retail shopping center, without giving any other details
of the building design or lot layout or investing any further in the pro-
ject."2 Under spectrum vesting, such a developer could nevertheless
protect the land from, for example, a future downzoning of the land
to residential only use.333 Finally, this analysis does not resolve the de-
bate over whether vested rights should be granted upon filing of a
324 See Wynne, supra note 8, at 916.
323 See id.
526 See infra notes 327-334 and accompanying text.
30 See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 1, at 723-24; cf. Delaney, supra note 76, at
384-85 (attributes of majority rule create uncertainty).
328 cf. Delaney, supra note 76, at 384-85 (uncertain application of common law major-
ity rule leads to litigation).
329 cf. id. (under majority rule, courts have to determine what constitutes substantial
construction or substantial reliance).
33O
	 Prichard & Riegle, supra note 7, at 1004 (if local governments required more
disclosure in early applications, developers would incur more up front costs).
331 Cf. Delaney & Kominers, supra note 77, at 232 (granting vested rights at time of
permit application leads to permit speculation); Heeter, supra note 2, at 90 (granting
vested rights at dine of permit application leads to permit speculation); Wynne, supra note
8, at 920 (Washington's early vesting rule encourages permit speculation).
332 Cf. Delaney & Kominers, supra note 77, at 232; Heeter, supra note 2, at 90; Wynne,
supra note 8, at 920.
"3 See supra notes 301-303 and accompanying text.
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permit application or upon its approval, because the measure of dis-
closure would be the same at both points in time. 334
Nevertheless, a vested rights analysis which offers some middle
ground, while not a perfect solution, would encourage negotiation
over litigation.335
 The all-or-nothing outcomes of the current rules
push local governments and developers into litigation in a desperate
fight not to end up the losing party.336
 Under spectrum vesting, while
neither party would win everything, neither party would lose every-
thing. 337 Because even a litigated outcome would necessarily involve
compromise, the parties would be encouraged to find this point of
compromise on their own. 338
CONCLUSION
As real estate development projects continue to increase in scope
and expense, and as zoning regulations become more complex and
sensitive to environmental awareness, the vested rights debate will
remain a contentious issue in land use law. The fact that the three
dominant vested rights rules in use today generally assume that vested
rights protection requires an all-or-nothing result, forces the debate to
revolve almost solely around timing: should vested rights protection
be granted now or later? This outcome affords no compromise; either
developers gets all the protection from new regulations they want and
local governments get no flexibility to adapt projects to evolving pub-
lic interests, or local governments get all the flexibility they want, and
developers risk losing their projects altogether.
Courts already implicitly recognize that there is a relationship
between developers' disclosure of their project designs and the scope
of protection warranted. One way to add more flexibility to the cur-
rent vesting scheme is to expand or contract the scope of protection
granted based on the breadth of developers' disclosure. This would
mitigate the impact of the all-or-nothing outcome by allowing courts
and/or legislatures to award vested rights along a spectrum: more
334 See Overstreet & Kirchheim, supra note 1, at 1065-66.
335 See ROBERT COULSON, How TO STAY OUT OF COURT 7,19-21 (1984); ROGER FISHER
& WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 56-59,
70-75 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
3" See Delaney & Kominers, supra note 77, at 241-48; Overstreet & Kirchheini, supra
note 1, at 1064.
337 See supra notes 307-318 and accompanying text.
336 See COULSON, supra note 335, at 7, 19-21; FISHER & URY, supra note 335, at 56-59,
70-75.
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protection for developers and less flexibility for local governments
when developers have disclosed more details of their projects, and less
protection for developers and more flexibility for local governments
where developers have disclosed less details. Although this approach
would certainly not solve all the problems inherent in the tension be-
tween landowners and communities over development rights, it would
provide more evenhanded outcomes, and would encourage compro-
mise over litigation.
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